We analyze the effects of asymmetric switching costs on two identical firms that produce an homogeneous good and compete in prices. Both firms inherit a fraction of the market which is "locked-in" by the switching costs. When switching costs are low, firms face a tradeoff between charging a high price to their locked in customers, or pricing aggressively in order to attract the rival's market share. We characterize the (pure and mixed) equilibrium strategies and the associated payoffs for any pair of switching costs in the unit square.
Introduction
In various markets, consumers are constantly faced with switching costs when they try to change their purchasing behavior. These switching costs often reduce competition among firms, giving companies a certain degree of monopoly power over their customer base. Clear examples of this can be seen in several markets, for example in the information technology sector where the choice of a certain hardware conditions the choice and availability of other types of products, creating additional costs to change from one company to another; or in the cellular phone service industry where often firms demand the cellular phone be returned when changing service provider. These costs are internalize by consumers. This fact may allow firms to raise prices to their initial market share without fearing the loss of their market participation.
In this paper we study the firms' behavior and payoffs when consumers are faced with asymmetric switching costs. The model analyzed in this paper consists of two identical firms that engage in a one time price competition and trying to maximize expected payoff. We start with an initial split of the market between firms and consider fixed switching costs that consumers must directly pay to the firm that is being left. Since our interest lies in characterizing the firms pricing behavior, knowing the switching costs of their customer base and that of their rivals, we shall exclude other factors such as the quality or quantity that might alter the firms' or consumers' decisions.
We will analyze two cases, one in which a firm has the entire market and another when the market is split in two equal parts among firms. In many cases, the switching costs will be so high that consumers are going to be completely locked-in to one firm, giving that company the ability to charge the monopoly price to its consumers. In other cases, the magnitude of the switching cost shall allow firms to price more aggressively to try to poach their rivals customer base. We will characterize the firms' payoffs under any possible pair of switching costs that consumers might face.
More specifically, we find that if both switching costs are above a certain threshold, it is not profitable for firms to poach their rivals consumers and thus both firms charge the maximum price possible, since consumers are completely locked in. This is the only region where a pure strategy equilibrium exists. When one of the firms switching costs is below the fore mentioned threshold but the sum of both switching costs is relatively high, we find a mixed strategy equilibrium in which only one firm has the possibility to poach his rival's consumers. This implies that only one of the firms strategy places a positive probability on relatively low prices in an attempt to capture the entire market. We call this equilibrium a single sided poaching equilibrium. The last type of mixed strategy equilibrium that we find is when both switching costs are relatively small or in a subset of the single sided poaching equilibrium, where both firms may poach the others market share. For this type of equilibrium both firms strategies place a positive probability on high prices to gain the most from their inherited market share and they also place a positive probability on low prices in an attempt to attract the other firms customers. We call these type of equilibrium double sided poaching equilibrium.
Much work has been written in the switching cost literature. In [12] Klemperer reviews several models that incorporate switching costs with different characteristics. In the simplest model, he considers a duopoly that competes in two periods, where in the second period firms face an exogenous switching cost that is identical between firms and is so large that consumers are completely locked in to their initially chosen firm. In this context he manages to prove that first period competition is fierce enough to eliminate firms future margins. He also considers a model in which the goods offered by each firm are not perfect substitutes, giving leeway so that firms may extract a positive payoff from their consumers.
Again, he assumes that the switching cost is elevated and that it is unfeasible for a consumer to change firms. Klemperer also studies the effects switching costs have when consumers change their preferences in different periods [11] or when consumers have idiosyncratic switching costs [10] . A common feature of this literature is that switching costs are so high that consumers do not have incentives to change firms.
As a consequence consumers make their decisions only once, before they face any switching cost.
In [15] Shilony relaxes the assumption that consumers cannot change firm when they face switching costs. His paper considers n firms that are separated across different neighborhoods and if consumers want to purchase from a seller that is "far away", they must pay a fixed transportation cost c. For small values of c firms face a trade off between imposing a high price to satisfy their respective market share ("milk" their own customer base) or impose a low price to attract consumers from different neighborhoods ("poach" their competitors customer base). This trade off leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We extend this model to consider asymmetric switching costs among firms, which in some cases may give one firm an advantage over his rival. An important difference is that in our model the firms receive the switching cost that must be paid if a customer decides to switch, whereas in Shilony's model the cost is seen as a transportation cost and is wasted.
We see this paper as the characterization of the final period of a dynamic oligopoly model. In the first period of this model firms have two choices to make: what price to charge consumers and what incentive to offer to attract them 1 . This incentive is seen as a gift in the first period but it later turns into a switching cost since it must be returned in case a consumer would like to switch firms in the second period. This generates a potentially asymmetric situation in the final period, where we may have an asymmetric market distribution and where consumers must face different switching costs (depending on which provider they selected in the previous period).
The distribution of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the model considered.
In section 3 we characterize all of the possible resulting equilibria that can arise from this type of competition. We find the exact conditions necessary for firms to be able to fix the monopoly price without loosing their market share, and the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium when switching costs are relatively low and firms may poach their rivals consumers. In section 4 we give an intuitive explication of the 1 For example, a new cellular phone offered by cellular phone service companies or an initial teaser rate on a home mortgages.
equilibria characterize in the previous section, and finally in section 5 we conclude.
The Model
There are two firms i and j competing in price (denoted by p i and p j respectively) over one period. We assume that firm i has inherited a market share µ i ∈ {0, 1 2 , 1} (µ j denotes j 's initial market share), which is the proportion of the market inherited by firm i 2 . If a consumer is inherited by firm i she must pay a switching cost B i to that firm in order to change providers. We assume that the firms are identical, with their marginal costs normalized to zero.
Note that in this model we do not assume that it is too costly for consumers to switch; consumers may choose to do so, depending on the price difference between firms. This means that for a consumer inherited by i to switch to firm j the price difference must be greater than the switching cost B i , in other words p i > p j + B i . We assume that firms cannot differentiate their prices, therefore all consumers face the same prices no matter which firm they are initially attached to; and that the consumers' reservation
. This gives us the following demand function for firm i ,
And firm i 's payoff takes on the following form,
From this payoff function we can see that firms are torn between two choices, they can either charge a high price to extract the most from their "locked-in" consumers 3 or they can charge a lower price so as to attract their rival's market share. For some levels of B i , B j , this tradeoff generates mixed strategy equilibria.
Characterizations of Equilibria
In this section we shall characterize all of the possible equilibria that can arise in the game. They depend strongly on the magnitude of the switching costs that consumers must pay in order to switch firms. We fist study the case of a dominant firm that inherits the entire market (µ i ∈ {0, 1}). We find that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where the dominant firm retains the whole market. We then consider the case in where both firms share the market in equal parts (µ i = 1 2 ) and find 5 types of equilibria. In the presence of relatively high switching costs we find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both firms charge a monopoly price and do not loose market share. For all other cases we prove that there is no pure strategy equilibria and characterize 4 different mixed strategy equilibria. These 4 cases of mixed strategy equilibria can be separated in two types of strategies: 1 corresponds to a single sided poaching equilibrium and 3 correspond to a double sided poaching equilibrium.
In the single sided poaching equilibrium we have that only one of the firms has the chance to poach his rivals consumers. Informally this means that both firms strategies place a positive probability on high prices to "milk" their consumers, but only one of the firms strategy places a positive probability on relatively low prices so as to capture the entire market. In the double sided poaching equilibrium both firms have the ability to poach their rivals consumers. For these types of equilibria both of the firms strategy support small prices to poach the other customer base and they also support high prices to "milk" their existing market share. This final type of equilibria is later divided in three sub cases, which depend on the magnitude of the firms' switching cost.
Dominant Firm
In this subsection we find a pure strategy equilibrium of the game when j inherits the entire market. 
Proof:
With µ i = 0 we have that firm j inherits the entire market before the beginning of the game. Let us verify that p * i = 0, p * j = B j constitutes an equilibrium. With these price levels, the firms' payoffs are,
Given the consumer's demand function, if j raises its price in > 0, all of its customers will be better off returning j 's first period bond and purchasing from i . And if j reduces its price by > 0, it will keep its market share but will receive a lower payoff because of the price reduction. Therefore, firm j does not have an incentive to change its price.
If firm i decided to raise its price, the price difference between the two firms will be even smaller and consumers will have even fewer incentives to purchase from i , leaving i with the same payoff as before the change in price. If firm i reduces its price by > 0, it would sell to the entire market since consumers are better off returning the switching cost to j and purchasing from i . But firm i would receive a negative payoff since π 2i = − < 0, so it has no incentives to lower its price. Therefore, since neither firm has incentives to modify its price, p * i = 0, p * j = B j is an equilibrium.
■
This result is quite intuitive: if one firm has the entire market and consumers are tied by a switching cost B , then B is the maximum price the dominant firm can charge to maintain its market share. In fact it is optimal for the firm to charge that price and keep the whole market.
A Shared Market
The characteristics of the equilibria are strongly linked to the size of the switching costs. We shall prove that for "large" switching costs firms end up charging the monopoly price 4 . When at least one of the switching costs is "small" we prove that there is no pure strategy equilibrium and characterize two different types of mixed strategy equilibria. First, we characterize single sided poaching equilibrium, where there is a positive probability that one firm charges a low price and captures the whole market, with the other firm unable to retaliate. Next we study double sided poaching equilibria, where both firms capture the whole market with positive probability.
Large Switching Costs
In this case there is a pure strategy equilibrium that is easy to characterize and is intuitively appealing. 
Idea of Proof:
The intuition for this equilibrium is simple. Since the switching costs are so high, for a firm to poach on its rival's consumers, it must reduce prices drastically. The payoff received with this price reduction leaves firms worse off than charging the maximum price to their own inherited market share. Therefore in equilibrium firms charge the monopoly price. See 6.1 in the Appendix for details.
2 ) is equivalent to the typical assumption made in the switching costs literature: the switching cost is so high that firms do not have incentives to poach their rival's customers. 4 This type of equilibrium is the commonly used in models where consumers are confronted with switching costs; the idea is that the switching cost is so high that it is unfeasible for consumers to change firms and therefore the firms are able to charge the monopoly price.
At Least One Small Switching Cost
We first restate the Bertrand equilibrium in the context of our model.
Now we show that the nature of the equilibria when at least one switching cost is low is completely different to when both switching costs are large. In fact, here equilibria will always involve randomization. 
Idea of Proof:
The idea behind the proof is that for any pair of prices (p * i , p * j ) at least one of the firms has incentives to modify its price. Since one of the firms has a "small" switching cost, if it decides to charge a high price its rival will have incentives to poach its customers. Conversely, if the firm with a "small" switching cost imposes a low price so as to not risk losing his market share, then its rival will put a high price, since it is unable to poach, giving the first firm leeway to raise its price. This trade off is the essential reason as to why there is no pure strategy equilibrium. See 6.2 in the Appendix for details.
■
In order to characterize the mixed strategy equilibria we extend the methodology introduced in [15] by Shilony to the case of asymmetric switching costs that must be paid to firms (as opposed to symmetric switching costs that are deadweight lost).
Denote by F i , F j the price distribution (i.e., the strategy) chosen by each firm. Given our assumption that consumers always purchase the good when the price is less than one and that consumers inherited by firm i will only switch to j if p i > p j + B i we have the following expression the firm j 's expected payoff,
The first term in the second line corresponds to the case where firm i 's price is so low that all of j 's consumers decide to switch (and firm j receives the consumers switching cost). The second term expresses the payoff j receives in case that both firms retain their market share. And finally the third term reflects j 's payoff when it manages to capture the entire market. For a given strategy of firm i (F i ), we have that for every price in the support of d F j (firm j 's strategy), j 's payoff is a constant equal to V j . Therefore we have the following equality,
To derive the firms' strategies we shall consider a pair of auxiliary variables that represent the maximum and the minimum price that firm i uses with a positive probability, p i and p i respectively. 5 Before we derive the firms' strategies in these cases we shall prove two technical Lemmas that characterize the minimum price a firm will use and the features of a firms strategy near that price. 
Proof:
For the case B j > 0 see 6.4 in Appendix for details. For the case in which B j = 0 the proofs may be found in 6.10 and 6.11.
Definition 3.7. We will say that firm j poaches on firm i 's customer base if the equilibrium strategies are
such that
In such a case, with positive probability firm j will gain firm i 's consumers.
Single Sided Poaching Equilibrium. Let us first characterize the equilibrium in which only one firm may poach consumers from its rival. We call this type of equilibrium a single sided poaching equilibrium.
In this case we characterize both firms' strategies and are able to find explicit expressions for V i and V j .
Theorem 3.8. If the equilibrium strategies are such that there is single sided poaching, that is
then firm j 's pricing strategy has the following cumulative distribution,
These variables are also defined in Shilony [15] , but in that model assumes that both firms have the same maximum and minimum price since the switching costs are identical. However we characterize asymmetric equilibria where the switching costs are the same, but the minimum prices are not.
and firm i 's pricing strategy has the following cumulative distribution
2 , p i = p j = 1 and the firms' expected payoff are,
Idea of Proof:
Notice that the price difference between j 's maximum price and i 's minimum price is smaller than B j .
Therefore i never imposes a price that attracts j 's consumers. This means that the firms' equations for their expected payoffs take on a simpler form since,
therefore equation 3.2 takes on the following form,
Given the nature of the firms' expected payoff equations and using the fact that 
Proof:
Replace values for p i , p j , p i and p j in conditions I and I I of Theorem 3.8.
■
Observation: this result proves that even when we consider symmetrical switching costs B i = B j , we can have asymmetrical equilibria, where only one of the firms poaches its' rivals customers. This type of equilibria is not considered in Shilony's symmetrical switching cost model [15] .
The regions where these equilibrium exist can be seen in Figure 5 and the firms expected payoff can be seen graphically in Figure 6 .
This completes the study of equilibria in which only one firm has the possibility to attract its rival's consumers. Now we must find the equilibria in which both firms may poach customers.
Double Sided Poaching Equilibrium
If both firms are to poach with possible probability we must have
In other words j has the possibility to attract i 's consumers and vice versa. We will focus on the characterization of equilibria such that,
This condition tells us that the range of possible prices that a firm imposes is not too large compared to the switching costs. We obtain different types of equilibrium strategies when this last inequality holds with equality or with strict inequality.
The next two Lemmas characterize the relevant features of the equilibria for different cases of this last inequality.
Lemma 3.10. If the equilibrium strategies are such that there is double sided poaching and that
then firm j 's price has the following cumulative distribution, there must be a reduction in firm i 's expected payoff, and that F j must be increasing. By imposing these conditions we get the values and relationships for the variables described in the Lemma. See 6.6 in Appendix for details.
and the firms' expected payoff satisfy the following equation,
4V i V j − 2V i B j + 2V i B i + 2V j − 2V i − B j − 4V j B i + 2B i B j = 0
■
An example of the firms' pricing strategy in this equilibrium can be see in Figure 4 .
Note that Lemma 3.10 not only tells us the relationship that V i and V j must satisfy in this type of equilibrium, but it also gives us an expression for the distribution of prices used by j . Now we must analyze the case in which a firm's price spread is equal to the sum of both switching costs.
Lemma 3.11. If the equilibrium strategies are such that there is double sided poaching and that
then firm j 's price has the following cumulative distribution,
and the firms' expected payoff satisfy the following equation,
4V 2 j − 2V j B j − 2V i B j − 2V j B i + B i B j = 0
Idea of Proof:
As with Lemma 3.10, we must use the hypothesis to divide sop(d F i ) and sop(d F j ) into smaller intervals where we can derive F j 's functional form using equation 3.2 (see Figure 2 ). As before, this is done by canceling out the expressions for An example of the firms' pricing strategy in this equilibrium can be see in Figure 4 .
Now that we have found the firms' strategies and the conditions that their expected payoffs must satisfy, we can examine the types of double sided poaching equilibria that arise. We must solve the system of equations that the firms' expected payoff satisfy to find the particular expression that those payoffs take. We have three types of double sided poaching equilibria to consider:
Theorem 3.12. The optimal strategies characterized in Lemmas 3.10 and 3.11 give the following equilibria,
where ξ(x, y) takes the following expression,
where α(x, y) takes the following expression,
and
We just combine the results of Lemmas 3.10 and 3. with a connected support. 7 Here we impose the condition that that the maximum price must be less than 1. 8 Note that Shilony's proof of uniqueness for the equilibria derived in [15] does not consider the possibility of strategies without connected support.
To prove this result we must consider two separate cases,
and as with the other Lemmas in this section we must consider the properties that the firms' strategies must satisfy. Specifically for case a), we consider an interval of feasible strategies and find that we get two incompatible expressions for a firm's mixed strategy. This leads to a contradiction.
A similar analysis applies to case b) where we consider a large price spread for j 's strategy. This large price spread allows us to deduce that i 's price spread must be smaller than 2(B i +B j ), in which case
we fall under case a)'s assumptions, which we already proved to be false, giving us a contradiction. See 6.9 in Appendix for details.
■

Discussion of Equilibria
In the previous section we characterized the equilibria that can arise for all possible levels of (B i , B j ).
For the case in which one firms inherits the entire market we have that the dominant firm charges the switching cost that his consumers face, while the rivaling firm is left out of the market. When both firms inherit half of the market the results are very sensitive to the size of the switching costs. If both firms have relatively high switching costs (B i , B j ≥ 1 2 , characterized in Theorem 3.2) there is a pure strategy equilibrium where both firms charge the monopoly price and continue to split the market. This occurs because the firms do not fear the loss of their client base, thus giving them the liberty to charge the consumers' reserve price to maximize their profits. This result is in line with the typical assumption made in many switching cost models, in which this cost is so high that consumers never switch, eliminating any form of competition.
When one of the firms' switching cost is relatively low there is no pure strategy equilibrium, since the the firms can either charge high prices to "milk" their own consumers or charge a low price to "poach" their rivals customer base. This tradeoff forces us to find mixed strategy equilibria which can basically take two forms. What we call single sided poaching corresponds to equilibria where only one firm is able to capture the entire market with positive probability. In this case only that firm puts positive probability on low prices while the other concentrates in milking its inherited customer base. The non poaching firm may post prices below the monopoly price, but the purpose is to protect itself from losing market share, and does not intend to expand it. An interesting outcome of this equilibrium is that the payoff of the poaching firm is independent of B i and B j , and equal to the payoff received when it charges the monopoly price. The payoff received by the firm that cannot poach consumers depends on the value of his own switching cost and is lower than the monopoly payoff. The firms' expected payoff for the resulting equilibria can be seen in Figure 6 .
We denote by double sided poaching the case in which both firms are able to capture the entire market with positive probability. For these equilibria the firms' resulting strategies consist of two intervals (which may or may not be connected). One of these intervals (high prices) corresponds to price levels that firms use to "milk" their customer base and the other (low prices) corresponds to price levels where firms try to capture the entire market. In the characterization of the double sided poaching equilibria we must consider three different types of equilibria, which depend strongly on the range of the support of their strategies. The firms' expected payoff for these three types of equilibria can be seen in Figures 7, 8 , and 9.
With this, we have characterized equilibria for any values of (
2 , these different resulting equilibria can be seen in Figure 5 . It is important to mention that for some of the values of (B i , B j )
there is more than one equilibrium. We do not find any reason why one equilibrium should be selected over another and the correct choice of a refinement will depend on the concrete application being considered.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the effects that asymmetric switching costs can have on firms' strategies and payoffs. We introduce a simple model, where two identical firms have inherited a fraction of the market.
Consumers who are inherited by firm i face a cost of switching to firm j that is, in general, different from the cost of switching of a consumer inherited by firm j . In our model, these switching costs are paid out to the firm that the consumer leaves, and are not deadweight lost (as in, for example, Shilony [15] ).
For any combination of switching costs we characterize at least one resulting equilibrium. In many cases multiple equilibria may exist. In the case of high switching costs, firms act as a monopoly over their customer base, eliminating any benefits from price competition. This is the case assumed in most of the switching cost literature, which considers exogenously high switching costs that eliminate any possibility for consumers to change their decisions. When we move to analyze the case of smaller switching costs, the firms market power dissipates and at least one of the firms' payoff is reduced. Pure strategy equilibria do not exist, since firms confront a stark tradeoff between charging a high price to their own customers (which are, to a certain degree, locked in), or pricing aggressively to try to capture their rival's market share. These results extend the analysis documented in Shilony [15] to the case of asymmetric switching costs that must be paid out to the firm from which the consumer switches.
The main contribution of this paper is the fact that we consider asymmetric switching costs be-of the equilibrium. We consider this to be an essential stage of a full model where switching costs are strategically chosen in a previous stage of the game. The ultimate goal of such a model is to understand the implications that endogenously chosen switching costs may have on the degree of competition between two identical firms. The equilibriums characterized in this paper will be the resulting equilibrium for the final period of such a multi-period model, allowing for a complete characterization of subgame perfect equilibria. The open question is then posed: if we consider completely rational consumers that are forward looking and internalize all of the available information, does the possibility of giving gifts (which later on become switching costs) affect competition? This issue will be addressed in future work that depends on the results found on this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.2 :
We will show that these prices
are an equilibrium. With these price levels we have π 2i = π 2 j = 1 2 .
If firm i chooses a lower price to capture the entire market it receives the following payoff,
Therefore it does not have incentives to lower its price. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 :
Without loss of generality, we assume that
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze 6 different cases and find a profitable deviation in each one,
and in that case firm i has incentives to raise his price in so that he continues to have the entire market and raises his payoff.
(ii) max{0, p
2 , in this case firm i has incentives to raise his price in so that the he still retains his market share and raises his payoff.
+ B i : we have that both firms receive a payoff of zero. If j raises his price in so that he maintains his market share, he will receive a positive payoff.
we have that the payoff for firm j is π 2 j = p * 2 j 2 and in this case he has incentives to reduce his price in to capture all of i 's customers and have a payoff of π 2 j = p * 2 j − . For sufficiently small, this means a higher payoff for j .
, in this case firm j has incentives to raise his price in so that he still sells to the entire market but at a higher price.
(vi) p * 2i = p * 2 j = 1: here we have that j 's payoff is π 2 = 
This last expression has two possible values. We have that in one case,
in which case we have that − 
In the other case we have,
which implies that F j ( ) = 1 ∀ > 0. Since F j is a cumulative distribution, we know that F j is continuous from the right. Taking limit for when −→ 0 + we have that F j (0) = 1, this means that there is only one feasible price, sop(d F i ) = {0}, and therefore we are in presence of a pure strategy equilibrium. This is a contradiction with Proposition 3.2. −→←−
Proof of Lemma 3.6 part I:
Proof:
In this part we analyze the case when B j > 0. Let us suppose that F i is not continuous in p i , in other
) and assume that firm j imposes a price p j = p i 10 .
Therefore firm i 's expected payoff takes the following form,
This last expression must be equal to the right hand side of 3.1 when we make p converge to p i from the right. Since F i is a cumulative distribution function and therefore continuous from the right,
This implies that 
Proof of Theorem 3.8 :
The methodology consists in finding the firms strategies via equation 3.2 and then imposing necessary conditions upon the maximum and minimum prices so that we are able to find the firms expected payoff.
In this case, thanks to hypothesis (I ) and (I I ), equation 3.2 takes on a particular form for each firm. The firms expected payoff satisfy the following equations, and
What simplifies the analysis is the fact that the term in equation This last relationship is very intuitive. Since i cannot poach from j , it does not have any incentives to put a low price. Therefore, the minimum price it uses in equilibrium is the one where j could possibly begin to poach i 's consumers.
Let us consider p
which gives us,
If we consider p > p j + B i , using the same argument we can find an expression for F j from 6.2,
Thus we have the following expressions for F j and F i ,
Using Lemma 3.6 we can find relations between p i , p j and V j ,V i . In fact,
With these relationships and equation 6.3, we can write,
Now let us see the conditions that must be imposed on the minimum and maximum prices. First, consider p * ≥ p i , we must have a reduction in expected payoff for firm i in equation 6.2. Given the expression we have for F j , we know that F j (p * − B i ) ≡ K , therefore we have
Since the left hand side of the above equation is increasing in p * , therefore get p i = 1. In a similar manner, if we consider p > p j , we must have
which means that p j = 1 since the left hand side is increasing in p . Now, evaluating 6.1 in p j = 1, we get an expression for V j ,
and using these values, combined with equation 6.5 we have that V i = 
From equation 3.2 we get,
But this would mean that we do not have a constant value for V j , which is a contradiction.
Therefore we have that
The methodology consists of considering p in different sub intervals of sop(d F j ) which simplifies expression 6.6 and allows us to solve
, and equation 6.6 becomes,
which means that, 
.7 takes on the following form,
which implies that,
Using the same argument for F i , if we consider p ∈ [p j , p i −B i ] we have that F i (p −B j ) = 0 and therefore from equation 6.7 we get,
With this we have completely characterized F j 's functional form .From before we know that
, and since F j must be continuous from the right, we have that F j (p) takes on
F i 's partially characterized from Lemma 3.6 we know that it is continuous at p
To complete the proof we must find the value of p i and the relationship that V i and V j must satisfy under these conditions. Let us consider p * ≥ p i , we must have the following inequality,
Thus the above inequality can be written as,
and since K < 1 13 we have that the right hand side of the above inequality is increasing in p * . We know that for p = p i −B i equation 6.7 holds, therefore if we raise i 's price we cannot have reduction in the firm's expected payoff. Which is a contradiction, therefore p i = 1.
Consider p ≤ p i , we must have the following inequality,
Since the right hand side is increasing in p , we shall consider in the most restrictive case p = p i = 2V j − B j . Also, we can write
from 6.8 and replacing the value of p i ,
Another condition that must be imposed over F j is that it must be an increasing function. The only possible points that may infringe this condition are the points where F j changes its functional form,
Thus considering inequalities 6.9 and 6.10 we have,
which completes the proof of the Lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3.11 :
In the proof of this Lemma we shall use similar arguments to those used in the proof of Lemma 3.10.
From Figure 2 we can see the partition of sop(d F j ) and sop(d F i ) resulting from the Lemmas hypothesis.
Note that the partition of sop(d F j ) does not have an interval in which F j is constant (like in Lemma 3.10)
due to hypothesis (I ). For these hypothesis equations 6.6 and 6.7 still represent the equations that the firms expected payoff must satisfy. 
from which we can find the following expression from F j ,
In the same way, we can find an expression for F i considering p * ∈ [p i +B j , p i ] and using equation 6.6,
Repeating the same process with equation 6.6 we get,
With this we have completely characterized F j 's functional form,
From Lemma 3.6 we know that F i is continuous at p i . Therefore,
By having an expression for p i , thanks to hypothesis (I ), we know that p i = 2V j + B i . As before, to find a relationships between V i and V j we must impose the some necessary conditions over p i and p i .
For p * ≥ p i we must have, 15 15 Obviously F j (p * + B j ) = 1.
For p * sufficiently close to p i we have an expression for F j (p * −B i ), which means that the above inequality reduces,
Therefore, the most restrictive case in inequality 6.12 is p * = p i which can be written as,
we must have,
and considering p sufficiently close to p i we have an expression for F j (p +B j ). Thus the above inequality takes on the following form,
Notices thatL(p) is increasing increasing in p ,
Therefore the most restrictive case for inequality 6.14 is p i = 2V j − B j which can be written as,
Hence, combining conditions 6.13 and 6.15 we get
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.12
We separate the different cases depending on the hypothesis considered,
In this case both firms' strategies are characterized by Lemma 3.10, therefore we have the following system of equations,
By solving this system we get the expressions for V i and V j for this case.
In this case, firm j 's strategy is characterized by Lemma 3.10 and firm i 's strategy is characterized by Lemma 3.11, therefore we have the following system of equations,
The case when we have p j − p j < B i +B j and p i − p i = B i +B j , we must simply interchange i with j in the system of equations.
In this case both firms' strategies are characterized by Lemma 3.11, therefore we have the following system of equations,
By solving this system we get the expressions for V i and V j for this case. 
Proof of Theorem 3.14 :
We consider two different cases,
First, let us analyze case a). Given the hypothesis of the theorem we can see the partition of the Figure 3 and as before we will derive firm j 's strategy using equation 3.2,
For p > p j − B j , we have that F j (p + B j ) = 1 therefore the above equation becomes,
where we can solve for the following expression of F j can be seen in Figure 3 , but with a larger distance between p j and p j .
For p > B i , and since cumulative distribution functions are increasing, from 3.2 we have,
rewriting the last inequality,
Therefore, we can write equation 6.18 replacing the expression of F j (p + B j ) from 6.16 giving us the following inequality, 18 Note that these arguments can also be used to find expressions for
for case b. 19 Remember that hypothesis I assures us that p
The most restrictive case for p we have that
or equivalently,
which we know from case a) reversing the roles of i and j that cannot be an equilibrium. 
We have the following expressions for the firms expected payoffs, 
Giving an expression for F j , we can derive the following equality for 
since we have that the left hand side is increasing in p , we must make the bound hold in the most restrictive case, p = p i = p j therefore we have,
therefore a = 0, completing this part of the proof. since the double poaching equilibrium described by case I does not occur when one bond is equal to zero (see Figure 5 ).
We will characterize the equilibrium considering a possible discontinuity in p Now we must derive a result similar to that of Lemma 3.10 for j , but without assuming continuity of F i in p i . As before, we can find F j 's functional form using equation 3.2 in the same way we did for the proof of Lemma 3.10 24 . Thus the firms' strategies take on the following form, 
The right hand side of the above inequality is increasing in p we shall consider the most restrictive case 
